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SCHAUER ON
ON PRECEDENT
PRECEDENT IN THE
U.S. SUPREME
SUPREME COURT
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William A.
A. Edmundson*
Edmundson·
William
Professor Schauer
Schauer has
has told us what it takes for a case
case to be
be treated
treated
Professor
precedent, and what
what it takes for a judge
judge to follow a norm
nonn of
of
as a precedent,
empirical studies of U.S.
precedent. Based upon his reading of empirical
U.S.
of
law
faculty,
infonnal canvass
canvass
law
Supreme Court voting patterns, an informal
Supreme
dissent," he concludes
"persistent dissent,"
concludes that stare
phenomenon of "persistent
and the phenomenon
decisis has but a "rare"
"rare" and "weak"
"weak" influence
influence on the Court. I think
decisis
Schauer exaggerates,
exaggerates, despite
despite his carefully
carefully hedging his thesis.
Schauer
WHAT
WHAT IT IS
Is TO FOLLOW PRECEDENT
PRECEDENT

isolate where and how he exaggerates,
exaggerates, it is necessary
necessary first to
To isolate
"[T]o
writes:
sketch how he sets up the terms of inquiry. He
"[T]o follow
sketch
precedent is to take a precedent's
precedent's very status-its
status-its source and not its
precedent
content-as a precedent, as a reason for deciding the issue now in the
content-as
been decided
decided in the past."
past.,,11 I think Schauer is
same way as it had been
correct in stating what it is to follow a precedent.
precedent. To follow a prior
correct
decision as a precedent is not to take the that decision merely as
decision
pointing to the existence of eligible reasons to decide the instant case
in a certain way; rather it is to take the prior decision as itself a reason
to decide the instant case a certain way. This is what he means by
content-independent reason to decide a fresh
taking a precedent
precedent as a content-independent
case similarly. I might add that to follow the doctrine of stare decisis
precedent is to appeal to that precedent
with respect to a given precedent
ratio decidendi
decidendi would
would
without regard to the persuasive force its ratio
possess on its own, even if it had not been decisive of any prior case
at all.
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•* Professor
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SOMEONE Is
IS FOLLOWING PRECEDENT
How TO TELL WHETHER SOMEONE

So far, so good. But I think Schauer's test for the existence of a
norm of precedent needs sharpening. He writes: "a
"a reliable test of the
precedent . . . would be the frequency
existence or force of a norm of precedent..
of instances in which a Justice who would have decided a case in one
way held 2otherwise solely because of the obligation to follow
precedent.
precedent.",,2
counterfactual: it counts a judge
The test he states is counterfactual:
judge as following a
differently
norm of precedent only if she decides the case before her differently
decided it in the absence of a duty to
from how she would have decided
follow precedent. But to correctly
norm-following behavior
correctly attribute norm-following
to an individual it is neither necessary
necessary nor sufficient
sufficient for there to be a
duty to follow that norm. 3 What matters is whether the judge-rightly
wrongly-takes the precedent itself as
as a reason
or wrongly-takes
reason for deciding
deciding the
case in the way compliance
compliance with the norm of stare decisis would
require (assuming that that way is determinable).
determinable). Schauer
Schauer elsewhere
expresses
expresses this very view:

A rule exists for an agent only to the extent that that agent does
treat
... an agent internalizes
treat it as a reason for action ...
internalizes a rule when
an
an agent
agent treats
treats a prescriptive
prescriptive generalization
generalization as entrenched,
entrenched, taking
the fact of
of a decision's falling within
within the extension
extension of that
prescriptive
generalization
as
a
reason
for
making
prescriptive generalization as a reason for making that
that decision aa

2. ld.
Id.
3.
3. The
The distinctions
distinctions between
between following
following a norm,
norm, being
being obligated
obligated to follow
follow a norm,
norm, and
and following a
norm
norm because
because obligated
obligated to
to do
do so
so may
may be
be brought
brought out in
in the
the following example.
example. Suppose
Suppose a circle
circle of
of folk
folk
dancers
dance, which
dancers is
is executing
executing aa certain
certain dance,
which is
is defined
defined by a set of norms.
norms. The dancers, having
having begun
begun the
the
dance, follow
dance,
follow the
the dance-defining
dance-defining norms,
norms, are
are obligated
obligated to do
do so (having
(having joined
joined the
the circle),
circle), but do not
not
follow
(solely) because
follow the
the norms
norms (solely)
because obligated.
obligated. A
A dancer
dancer might
might tire of the dance
dance and wish
wish it over, but
continue
continue because
because she
she believes
believes herself
herself obligated.
obligated. Now
Now suppose
suppose aa novice
novice is standing
standing outside
outside the
the circle,
circle,
trying
trying to
to learn
learn the
the dance.
dance. He
He is
is following
following the
the norms
norms (however
(however ineptly),
ineptly), but
but is not
not obligated to do so,
so, and
and
does
at any
any time.
time. Nonetheless,
Nonetheless,
does not
not do
do so
so because
because obligated.
obligated. Not
Not having
having joined
joined the
the circle,
circle, he
he may
may give
give up
up at
he
he follows
follows the
the norms
norms and
and the
the norms
norms "exist"
"exist" for
for him.
him. (This
(This example
example is
is drawn
drawn from
from personal
personal experience
experience as
as
late Antioch
Antioch College.)
College.)
aa freshman
freshman at the late
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certain way. When an agent does so, the rule exists for that
agent.4
We have to bear in mind that there is a difference between
between cases in
which a norm makes a decisive difference
difference and cases in which the
norm is operative
operative but not decisive. The latter type of case may be one
in which the norm is overridden
overridden (more on that below) but it is often
often
rather one of overdetermination.
overdetermination. For a given judge,
judge, reasons both of
of
precedent
precedent and policy may point to the same result. In such cases, it is
ambiguous whether a judge follows a precedent
precedent as such, or rather as a
vivid repository of independently
persuasive
independently persuasive reasons. But we are not
justified
justified in saying that the norm is operative only in those cases in
which it makes a decisive difference. Such cases may indeed be few
overdetermined result is likely to
to
(and one may hope they are, for an overdetermined
be a more widely acceptable
acceptable result), but that does not mean that the
norm only rarely operates.
decisive operation does not entail
operates. Rarity of decisive
simpliciter. Schauer's test accommodates
accommodates this
rarity of operation, simpliciter.
point.
To determine whether a norm of precedent exists for a
multimember
multimember court, Schauer's
Schauer's test has to be modified. Ironically, the
counterfactual test could make it deceptively easy to say that stare
counterfactual
decisis was at work. A single Justice might adhere to stare decisis,
and alter the outcome
outcome in a case by casting a deciding vote, even
though the rest of the Court voted ideologically. The stare-decisisstare-decisisfollowing Justice alters the outcome, but surely a norm of stare
decisis can't be said to be followed by the Court.
Court. Should the pivotal
voter decide sufficiently
sufficiently many close
cases,
though, the idea that the
close
Court follows stare decisis would be at least intelligible-even
intelligible-even
Court
correct--despite
correct--despite the fact that only a single member
member of the Court does
so. The lesson is that stare decisis may be present and weighty even
even
though widely repudiated. The same is true in the individual case: a
Justice
of, say, coherence;
Justice might reject stare decisis in favor of,
coherence; but, in
4. FREDERICK SCHAUER,
SCHAUER, PLAYING
PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION
EXAMINATION OF RULEBASED
(1991).
BASED DECISION-MAKING
DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 121
121 (1991).
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decisions" as
practice, that Justice might take "past political decisions"
furnishing pro tanto
tanto and normally decisive reasons to decide new
cases
continuously
with them.
cases
Schauer correctly
correctly hightlights the role of thresholds
thresholds as distinguishing pseudo-precedent
pseudo-precedent from the real deal. He writes:
[A]n overridable obligation can be considered an obligation only
if the threshold for override is higher than the threshold
threshold would
have been ... ..absent
obligation ....
absent the obligation.
. . . [I]f a court under a
purported
purported regime of stare decisis is free to disregard any previous
decisions it believes
is
believes wrong, then the standard
standard for disregarding is
the same when stare decisis applies as when it does not, and the
alleged stare decisis norm turns out to be doing no work. If this is
is
if,
so, then stare decisis does not in fact exist as a norm at all. But if,
by contrast, it requires a better reason to disregard a mistaken
precedent
precedent than merely that it is believed
believed mistaken, a stare decisis
norm can be said to exist even if it is overridable.
overridable.55

So the existence question turns not on whether precedents
precedents are
sometimes overruled or ignored. A judge may be guided
guided by stare
decisis in cases in which she does not follow stare decisis. But
Schauer rightly points out that if a norm of stare decisis is indeed at
Schauer
work, we are entitled to expect that "there
"there will exist at least some
decisions that are followed because
because of the norm that would not
otherwise be followed, and that some wrong but not extremely
extremely wrong
agreement from those who
decisions remain on the books, or attract
agreement
6
differently."
them
decided
would have
them differently.,,6
That is the test (subject to the caveat entered above, against
against
decisiveness with effectiveness).
confusing decisiveness
effectiveness). Now, to the evidence. It
is of three kinds. The first are the studies of Segal and Spaeth, who
have concluded
concluded that the norm of stare decisis is a very weak norm in
the Supreme
Supreme Court. Another consists of the impressions reported by
by
5. Schauer, supra
supra note I,
1, at 389-90.
5.
391.
6. Id
ld. at 391.
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Con Law
Law faculty
faculty at several
several institutions,
institutions, principally
principally Harvard
Harvard Law.
Law. The
Con
dissent"
"persistent
of
appeal to the
the prevalence
prevalence of "persistent dissent" on the
third isis an appeal
third
Court.
SEGAL AND
AND SPAETH
SEGAL

Segal and Spaeth
Spaeth report
report that the votes
votes of Justices
Justices are
are more strongly
strongly
Segal
influenced by their individual
individual ideologies
ideologies than
than by precedent.
influenced
Precedent is cited, they say, more as aa matter
matter of post
post hoc
Precedent
Realists
the
Legal
as
constraint-just
as
prior
than
rationalization
constraint-just
Legal
rationalization
observed eighty years ago.
observed
Without going into Segal
Segal and Spaeth's
Spaeth's methodology, two points
Without
can be made that immediately
reliance into doubt. First
Schauer's reliance
immediately call Schauer's
is the point that a weak norm is a norm. A norm may be weak in
many ways that do not throw
throw its existence
existence into serious doubt. The
norm that governs calling pitches strikes or balls has a much
much greater
greater
season-than does the
impact on the outcome
outcome of a baseball game--or season-than
Infield Fly Rule. That, alone and with other considerations,
considerations, may
make the Infield Fly Rule a weak norm, in multiple senses. It is
poorly understood. It is rarely invoked. The line the Rule draws
between infield and outfield is much vaguer than those drawn by the
fair ball-foul ball rule and the balls-and-strikes rule. The Rule could
be probably repealed
repealed without radically altering the complexion
complexion of the
of
nonetheless surely a norm of
game. But the Infield Fly Rule is nonetheless
baseball.
The second point is that stare decisis often operates most
effectively
effectively in areas in which moral intuitions are feeble and
"substantive policy
policy views"
views" unformed.
unformed. In
In such deserts, precedent may
"substantive
appear as aa welcome oasis, wholly apart from any thought that here
another way, Justices
reliance interests must reign. To put the point another
may not always have a prior view on the merits, and precedent
relieves them of an occasion to
to formulate one. This is a difference
test;
register vividly on Schauer's test;
precedent can make that does not register
an
clearer
no
have
Justices
the
that
but surely it is
case
often the case
is often
less "policy") demands than
intuition of
what result justice (much less
of what
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difference here by
anyone else. It isn't that precedent makes a difference
squelching the conviction that a contrary result would be righter
though not extremely so. It makes a difference by pretermitting the
need to form a view about what would be the right result, precedent
aside. The result consistent with precedent is then right enough, by
default, and the burden falls to others to show that it is extremely
extremely
wrong.77
AVOWALS OF CONSTRAINT
AVOWALS

How often does a Justice confess to following an erroneous
precedent
solely because it is precedent?
precedent? I leave it to those with
precedent solely
greater familiarity with the Court to add to Schauer's list, which he
has gathered from expert law faculty. I suspect
expanded
suspect that even an expanded
list would not unseat Schauer's judgment that "crisp
examples"
of
"crisp examples" of
especially if the domain is
avowed precedent-following
precedent-following are few, especially
restricted
of
restricted to constitutional cases. What to make of it? Again, rarity of
conspicuously
decisive
operation
of
conspicuously
operation
stare decisis is not conclusive
evidence
that
it
is
rarely
operative-especially
of
operative---especially if the appearance
appearance of
evidence
rarity can be otherwise explained.
There
appearance deceptive,
deceptive, several
There are many reasons to think the appearance
of which Schauer
Schauer points to. One is the nature of the Court's docket.
Cases
controlled
by precedent
Cases
precedent are less interesting
interesting and so less "certworthy."
constitutional right are not in play,
worthy." Where mighty issues of constitutional
it is less likely that extraordinary
extraordinary reasons will be present
overcome
present to overcome
the weight of precedent. One reason an individual Justice
Justice might have
for not avowing stare decisis as his or her sole reason for deciding a
certain
culture one is expected
expected to
certain way is that in our discursive legal culture
marshal all the reasons
reasons at one's
one's disposal. Few now would cherish the
distinction of being
a
being "rule-worshipper"
"rule-worshipper" in practice,
practice, as opposed
opposed to
principle.
Even
Justice
Scalia's
high
regard
for
rules
seems
principle. Even
regard
seems not
not to
extend
extend in any reliable way to stare decisis.
7.
dismissed as
Court chooses
7. This
This use
use of
of precedent
precedent should
should not
not be
be dismissed
as mere
mere laziness.
laziness. If
If the
the Court
chooses to hear
hear no
no
more than eighty
eighty cases
cases a year there
there are other reasons.
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The Supreme
Supreme Court has remarked on stare decisis only rarely,
8
PlannedParenthood
Parenthoodv. Casey
:
easel:
most recently in Planned
The obligation to follow precedent
precedent begins with necessity, and a
contrary necessity marks its outer limit. With Cardozo, we
recognize
recognize that no judicial system could do society's work if it
eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised it. Indeed, the
very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution
Constitution
requires
requires such continuity
continuity over time that a respect for precedent is,
by definition, indispensable. At the other extreme, a different
necessity
should
necessity would make itself felt if a prior judicial ruling should
come to be seen so clearly as error that its enforcement
enforcement was for
that very reason, doomed. 99

Schauer's point that stare decisis accommodates
This division reflects
reflects Schauer's
accommodates
overrulings
overrulings founded on extraordinarily
extraordinarily strong reasons. The opinion
continues:
overrule a prior case is not, as in the
Even when the decision to overrule
rare, latter instance, virtually foreordained, it is common
common wisdom
command," and
"inexorable command,"
that the rule of stare decisis is not an "inexorable
certainly it is not such in every constitutional case. Rather, when
is
this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment
judgment is
customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic
pragmatic
considerations
considerations designed
designed to test the consistency
consistency of overruling
overruling a
prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the
reaffirming and overruling
respective costs of reaffirming
overruling a prior case. Thus,
for example, we may ask whether the rule has proven to be
intolerable
intolerable simply in defying practical
practical workability; whether the
reliance that would lend a special
rule is subject to a kind of reliance
hardship to the consequences
consequences of overruling and add inequity to
8. Planned Parenthood
Parenthood of Southeast
Southeastern
em Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
(1992).
Id. at 854 (citations omitted in text but gathered in BENJAMIN
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO,
CARDOZO, THE NATURE
NATURE OF THE
9. Id.
THE
Stare Decisis
Decisis and
and Judicial
JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921),
(1921), and Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare
Judicial Restraint,
Restraint, 1991 J.
SUP. CT. HIST. 13, 16 (1991)).
(1991)).
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so
the cost of repudiation; whether
whether related principles
principles of law have so
far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant
of abandoned
abandoned doctrine; or whether facts have so changed, or
come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of
of
0
significant
significant application or justification.'
justification. 10
A lot turns on what might be meant by the phrase
phrase "when this Court
reexamines a prior holding"
reexamines
holding" where that holding was not doomed by
the overwhelming
overwhelming weight of reasons. What the Court goes on to say
reaffirming-which is
is that it then weighs up costs and benefits of reaffirming-which
not stare decisis. At first glance, it seems as though the Court has
confessed
confessed Schauer's point. But we can and should look again.
If "when" means "whenever
"whenever we feel like, despite the absence of
of
'clear[]
error'
making
enforcement
'doomed,"' then the rule the
'clear[] error' making enforcement 'doomed,'"
Court sets out is not stare decisis, as Schauer defines
defines it (and I would
agree with his understanding).
understanding). What the Court would be talking about
about
is akin to a "bursting
bubble"
presumption,
where
the
bubble
bursts
at
"bursting bubble"
a mere glance. But if "when" means, "when there is a prima facie
facie
holding," then what is
special justification
justification for revisiting the prior holding,"
stated is consistent with a Schauerian
Schauerian rule of stare decisis, even if
what ensues from that point in the reasoning is a balancing up of
of
reasons, possibly including
consistency among
including stability, reliance, and consistency
among
others."I I Bear in mind that the Court-just
Court-just like anybody else-may
others.
be unable to formulate or correctly
correctly formulate the rule it follows. So,
even if Casey's
"when"
isn't
Casey's "when" is interpreted the first way, that isn't
conclusive of the question, "Does precedent
precedent really matter in the
12
Court?,,12
Court?'

10. Id.
[d. at 854-55 (citations omitted).
11.
Court-a
II. One way to understand the "rule of four" is as a signal from four members of the Court-a
certiorari-that the petition
succeeds in showing
number sufficient
sufficient for a writ of certiorari-that
petition succeeds
showing that there is indeed
indeed a
"prima facie
special justification."
If that
correct, then-as
Schauer acknowledges-stare
"prima
facie special
justification." If
that is
is correct,
then-as Schauer
acknowledges-stare decisis will
often expend
expend itself at that stage, and be difficult to detect at work in the subsequent
subsequent decision.
12.
Casey "test"
"test"
12. My colleague
colleague Eric Segall insists that the Court has never applied
applied anything like the Casey
-not
Casey itself.
itself. I take his point but do not assign it the significance
significance he does.
-not before,
before, not since, not in Casey
formulation of that norm is
Following a norm is one thing: having in hand and applying a canonical formulation
Casey dictum
another. It may be worth
worth noting that the Casey
dictum reportedly was slotted into the Court's opinion to
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PERSISTENT DISSENT

A Justice devoted to stare decisis ought to apply the Court's
Court's
precedents, and not dissent when it comes time to apply them. Yet
crisp examples of persistent
persistent dissent are rife while crisp examples of
of
avowed submission to precedent are few-in constitutional
constitutional cases
anyway. Why, if a rule of stare decisis exists for the Court?
As Schauer is no doubt aware, persistent
persistent dissent is most often
often
manifested
by
Justices
who
participated
on
the
losing
side
in
the
prior
participated
manifested
decision
decision that has become the relevant precedent. This suggests a
psychological
psychological explanation. A Justice who has personally
personally invested
invested in a
doctrine
precedent is likely to discount
doctrine precisely contrary
contrary to that of a precedent
the cogency
cogency of that precedent
precedent far more steeply than he or she would if
not so invested. Submission to such precedents
precedents by silence (or
(or
separate concurrence)
concurrence) may feel pusillanimous (or pouty) if the high
horse of dissent is already saddled and ready. That is unlikely to be so
for a Justice faced with a precedent
precedent he or she may think wrong, but
had no part in.
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

Schauer concludes with two points. One, the Roberts Court
shouldn't
shouldn't be criticized
criticized for departing from a stare decisis norm
honored by its predecessors,
predecessors, for, in fact, its predecessors have not
taken stare decisis seriously. Two, the impulse to criticize
criticize may
non-ideological discussion
nonetheless be turned to a profitable and non-ideological
of the desirability of valuing "stability, consistency, settlement,
reliance, notice, and predictability,,13-what
predictability" 13-what we could call "the stare
decisis values"-to
values"-to a higher degree than the Court has done.
On the first point, the critics of the Roberts Court might be
understood differently
differently and somewhat more charitably. In any case,

placate Justice
Justice Souter,
Souter, whose
whose formula
formula itit is.
is. See
placate
See JEFFREY
JEFFREY TOOBIN,
TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD
OF THE SUPREME
SUPREME COURT (2007).
(2007).
13. Schauer, supra
supranote I,
1, at
at401.
40 I.

Published by Reading Room, 2008
HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 411 2007-2008

9

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 2
412

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
REVIEW

[Vol. 24:403
[Vol.

14
Schauer
surely right that if they
theyl4
are transparently
motivated by a
Schauer is surely
transparently motivated
precedents they find morally attractive
attractive from reversal
desire to protect precedents
or erosion at the hands of the Court, their making a call for a return to
l5 is unlikely to be either
either persuasive
persuasive or effective.
stare decisis 15
important
As to the second point, II agree that stare decisis serves important
values. But I doubt that (over)emphasizing
(over)emphasizing the infirmity of the norm
precedent is the most effective way to reinvigorate
of precedent
reinvigorate it. It is usually
usually
compliance with an existing rule than to make
easier to urge compliance
persuasive
persuasive a case for imposing
imposing a new one. Fresh constraints
constraints tend to
is
be more irksome than those we have grown used to.'
to. 166 This after all is
part of the charm of stare decisis.
commentary abstractly
served
Besides, critical
critical commentary
abstractly keyed to the values served
by stare decisis may lead attentive
attentive Justices to consult those values
values
directly, rather than the precedents. But employing a rule of stare
decisis is not the same as making it a practice to weigh up anew the
stare-decisis values from case to case.'
"What strong justification
stare-decisis
case. 177 "What
justification is
there for overturning
overturning the rule of case C?" is not the same inquiry as

14. "The critics"
critics" Schauer is concerned
example" of an
concerned to set straight include the "prominent
"prominent example"
an
Editorial--Editorial, Justice
JusticeDenied,
Denied,N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2007,
2007, at 12.
12. But the Times's chief
chief complaint
complaint is
Editorial-Editorial,
"Time and again
that "Time
again the court has ruled, almost always 5-4, in
in favor of corporations and powerful
powerful
interests while slamming
slamming the courthouse door on individuals
individuals and ideals that truly
truly need the court's
shelter." The Editorial is also critical of Chief Justice Roberts in particular
shelter."
particular for pursuing an
"archconservative approach"
approach" at
at the
expense of
of the
consensus" that he testified in his
the "greater
"greater consensus"
"archconservative
the expense
confirmation
under the rule of stare decisis
decisis
confirmation hearings
hearings he would seek
seek to promote. Precedent
Precedent is not invoked under
but as an indication of the "sharp
"sharp shift
shift to the right" the Court has taken despite the demands of
of
substantive justice, consensus on the Court, and fidelity to the Chief Justice's pre-appointment
pre-appointment
testimony.
Return to Stare
(1928), a Legal Realist
Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71 (1928),
15. Compare
Compare Herman
Herman Oliphant, A Return
Stare Decisis,
Realist
tour de force.
16. This is known among social psychologists
"endowment effect."
effect." See Daniel Kahneman,
psychologists as the "endowment
Kahneman,
Jack 1.
L. Knetsch &
Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and
Status Quo
& Richard Thaler, Anomalies:
and Status
Bias,
ECON. PERSP.
193-206 (1991).
(1991).
Bias,S5 J. ECON.
PERSP. 193-206
17. Joseph
"exclusionary" reasons depends crucially
Joseph Raz's concept of "exclusionary"
crucially on the difference
difference between
weighing
whether a threshold
threshold has been
weighing reasons for and against doing X, on one hand, and determining whether
met by reasons,
meet you at the diner functions properly
properly if I act
act
reasons, for or against doing X. My promise to meet
on the promise
excludes my acting
promise rather than on the reasons that inclined me to make it. The promise excludes
acting
on ordinary reasons to and not to do as promised, but does not exclude extraordinary
(e.g., that I
extraordinary reasons (e.g.,
can
challenged on the ground that it all comes
can save a life by breaking
breaking the date). Raz has been
been challenged
comes down to
weighing
weighing reasons: for I act on my promise only by at least implicitly judging that the weightiness of my
promise
conflicting reason. Exclusion, it is alleged, collapses
collapses into weighing.
promise is greater than that of any conflicting
For Raz's response to these and related challenges, see Joseph Raz, Facing
Facing Up: A Reply, 62 S. CAL. 1.
L.
REv.
1153 (1989).
REv. 1153
(1989).
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"To what extent
extent would stare-decisis values be served by following
the rule of case C?"
C?" The latter, perhaps
perhaps ironically, would not be to
apply the rule of stare decisis, but to dispense with it altogether.
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